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BANKRUPTCY FROM A FAMILY LAW PERSPECTIVE
G. STANLEY JOSLIN*

The points at which family interests are involved in the usual bankruptcy proceeding are many. Some are quite obvious, as dower rights
of the wife, alimony claims, or intra-family concealments. Others are
less conspicuous but no less potent, as exclusion of relatives and
spouses from certain rights, post-bankruptcy inheritances, cryptic exemption rights or evidentiary obligations. The scope here will not
be limited to the traditional academic "Family Law" concept but will
include that wider sphere where husbands, wives, and children are
actually and vitally concerned in a bankruptcy involving one of them.
Not only are the advantageous rights to be considered but also the
duties and burdens placed upon members because of the family unit.
It is with this broad concept of family law as it intermingles in the
law of bankruptcy that we are here concerned.
I. WIFE OR RELATIVE AS PETITIONMG CREDITOR.

It is clear that either spouse may become a voluntary or involuntary
bankrupt but the rights of the one in the early stages of a proceeding
in bankruptcy of the other are delimited. Section 59 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act2 provides that in computing the number of creditors of
a bankrupt for the purpose of determining how many creditors must
join in the petition, creditors who are relatives of the bankrupt shall
not be counted. A wife is a relative under section 1(27).3 Thus the
problem arises as to her situation in this regard when she is a creditor
of her husband in bankruptcy. At first the restriction seems clear and
unambiguous but by raising two questions some uncertainty may
result:
1. Does this mean a wife or relative may not be a petitioning creditor?
2. Does the limitation go only to the problem of ascertaining how many
creditors shall be counted in determining the number of persons who must
file the petition?

The dual nature of the problem may be illustrated by supposed

4
factual situations. Under section 59 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, if
there are twelve or more creditors, three or more creditors must
file a petition for involuntary bankruptcy. If the creditors are less

* Professor of Law, Emory University.
1. Bankruptcy Act § 4, 30 STAT. 547 (1898) as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 22
(Supp. 1955) (hereinafter cited to U.S.C.A. section only). See also 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 1(23), (33) (Supp. 1955).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. § 95(e) (1943).
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(27) (Supp. 1955).
4. Id. § 95 (b).
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than twelve, only one need file the petition. If the involuntary petition
has been signed by one creditor but later it appears there are fourteen
creditors, one of whom is the bankrupt's wife and the two others
relatives, the petition is sufficient as the three would not be counted
in ascertaining whether there were twelve or more creditors. On
the other hand, if there were more than twelve countable creditors
and the petition were signed by three creditors including the wife,
would the petition be sufficient? When there was no statutory limitation on the wife, it was held that she could be a petitioning creditor
in her husband's bankruptcy.5 Since section 59 (e) (2) has been held
to exclude creditors who are related to the bankrupt only for purposes
of determining the total number of creditors, in ascertaining the number of petitioning creditors required, and that a relative may still be
a petitioning creditor,6 it is clear that a wife or other relative may be a
petitioning creditor, although such relative may not be counted in
ascertaining the total number of creditors of the bankrupt for petition requirement purposes. The scope of this limitation on relatives
as creditors is quite extensive as "relatives" is defined to mean persons
related by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree as de7
termined by the common law and includes a spouse.
I. INTRA-FAmILY CREDITORS AND SELECTION OF TRUSTEE.
Relatives of the bankrupt are subject to further limitations in the
selection of the trustee in bankruptcy. Prior to 1938 the attitude of
the courts could be summed up in the words of a New York judge:
"There is no reason in law or morals why a relative of the bankrupt,
who is a legitimate creditor, shall not have the same right to vote for
a trustee as any other creditor."8 However, the wife was more closely
watched and as a creditor of her bankrupt husband, was not allowed
to dominate the choice of a trustee.9 The matter is now specifically
dealt with by the Bankruptcy Act's providing that creditors of the
bankrupt who are related by affinity or consanguinity, including the
spouse, may not participate in the election of a trustee.10 The object
of this provision seems based on an attitude less trustful of relatives.
"The purpose of the provision.., is to prevent the election of a trustee
who may be too friendly to the bankrupt and fail to protect the interests of creditors."" Here again the problem seems an untroubled
one, but when the manner of electing a trustee is considered, doubts
again arise.
5. In re Novak, 101 Fed. 800 (N.D. Iowa 1900).
6. Perkins v. Dorman, 206 Fed. 858 (D.N.M. 1913).

7. Bankruptcy Act. § 1(27), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(27) (Supp. 1955).
8. In re Rothleder, 232 Fed. 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
9. In re Ballantine, 232 Fed. 271 (N.D. N.Y. 1916).
10. § 1(27), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1(27) (Supp. 1955), 72(a) (1943).
11. In re Latham Lithographic Corp., 107 F.2d 749, 750 (2d Cir. 1939).
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Under section 56,12 a trustee is selected by a majority vote in number and amount of claims of all creditors. Only creditors present are
recognized in determining the majority necessary in number and
amount for selecting a trustee. If the creditor wife then attends the
creditors' meeting, is she disqualified only in determining the number of creditors present or is the amount of her claim also disqualified
in determining a majority in amount of claims? Suppose there are
three creditors present, one of whom is the wife of the bankrupt. It
is clear under section 44 (a) ,13 the wife may not be counted as a creditor
in determining the number of creditors empowered to elect a trustee.
However, if the wife's claim is for $5,000 and the combined claim of
the other two creditors, $4,500, the creditors could not elect a trustee
if the wife's claim must be included in ascertaining the total claims
present, and the court would be forced to name the trustee under
section 44(a).14 Section 56 (b) and (c),15 concerned with other disqualified creditors, are specific on this matter. Subsection b provides
"nor shall such claims be counted in computing either the number of
creditors or the amount of their claims," and subsection c, "shall
not be counted in computing the number of creditors voting or present
at creditors' meetings, but shall be counted in computing the amount."
Both concepts thus are seen to be recognized in the act itself. A
broad interpretation of the relative disfranchising provision of section
44 (a) seems logical. The result would be that the wife's or other relative's claims would be disregarded completely from the class of creditors that may vote for a trustee or be counted either in number or
amount of claims in ascertaining majorities required. 16 Reading sections 44(a) 17 and 56 (a) 1 8 together, the meaning could well be integrated as follows: Creditors, exclusive of the wife and relatives of
the bankrupt, shall at the first meeting appoint a trustee by a majority
in number and amount of claim of such creditors who are present. 19
III.

WIFE'S

DUTY

TO TESTIFY IN HUSBAND'S BANKRUPTCY.

The status of husband and wife when observed at the time of bankruptcy of the husband is one viewed by the lawmaker and the courts
12. Bankruptcy Act § 56(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 92(a) (1943).
13. Bankruptcy Act § 44(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 72(a) (1943).

14. Ibid.

15. Bankruptcy Act, § 56 (b), (c), 11 U.S.C.A. § 92 (b), (c) (1943).
16. Relatives are only disqualified at the creditors meeting in selection of
a trustee. In other matters they have full right of participation. § 56, 11
U.S.C.A. § 92 (1943).

17. Bankruptcy Act § 44(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 72(a) (1943).
18. Bankruptcy Act § 56(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 92(a) (1943).

19. "In our opinion § 44 creates a personal disability only. If a creditor who
would be disqualified to vote the claim in the debtor's bankruptcy assigns it
in good faith to a purchaser who is not disqualified, we can see no reason to
bar the latter from voting it." In re Latham Lithographic Corp., 107 F.2d 749,
750 (2d Cir. 1939).
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with vacillating ambivalence. The ancient common law, disqualifying
spouses from testifying for each other,20 together with the privilege not
to testify against the other,21 and the several state statutes with their
many variations of this husband-and-wife disqualification or privilege,
went far in refusing the right to delve into the transactions within this
relationship. The Bankruptcy Act, 22 however, indicates that the veil
must be drawn aside in bankruptcy matters and that the very nature
of the husband-wife relationship justifies a careful scrutiny of trans23
actions within the scope of the particular bankruptcy period.
Section 21 (a) of the act provides that the spouse of a bankrupt may
be required to appear and be examined, any law of the United States
or any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 24 The mandate is strong
and removes, in the scope of its coverage, the necessity of considering
the common-law or statutory provisions in the several states or other
federal laws on the problem of competency and privilege of the husband-wife relationship. However, the door is not thrown completely
open as the scope of section 21 (a) is narrowed so that the spouse may
be examined only concerning acts, conduct, or property of a bankrupt,
and only if touching business transacted by such spouse or to which
25
such spouse is a party and for the purpose of determining such facts.

If, then, this basis can be established, the rule of evidence of the Bankruptcy Act 26 alone will be applicable and the wife or spouse will be
required to testify notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.
The latitude of inquiry, once the proper basis is established, should
be broad as the wife is often the only witness who can be of help
27
(though recalcitrant) in discovering assets and revealing frauds.
The scope of section 21(a) 28 is further narrowed by other rules
of evidence. This provision of the Bankruptcy Act is one designed
primarily to give the bankruptcy court the power to require a spouse
to testify regardless of other law to the contrary, but it does 'not
alter the usual rules of evidence as to privilege, eliciting or properly
presenting evidence. The proposition may be illustrated by the situation where a wife is called to testify concerning her husband's bankSee 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 600, 601 (3d ed. 1940).
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2227 (3d ed. 1940).
Bankruptcy Act § 21, 11 U.S.C.A. § 44 (1953).
"[IUn many cases the wife is the only witness who can shed light upon
the whereabouts of concealed assets ... ." In re Hyman, 48 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.
20.
21.
22.
23.

1931).

24. 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1953). "All evidence shall be admitted which is

admissible under the statutes of the United States . . . or under rules of

evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which
the United States court is held. .

.

.The competency of a witness to testify

shall be determined in like manner." FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (a). (Emphasis added).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 21(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1953).
26. Ibid.
27. See In re Hyman, 48 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1931); In re Foerst, 93 Fed.
190, 191 (S.D. N.Y. 1899).

28. Bankruptcy Act § 21(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1953).
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ruptcy and the particular line of questioning goes to confidential
communications between a husband and wife. The communications
are privileged and the wife may not answer.2 9
Although the wife may be required to testify in this limited area,
it is a matter discretionary with the court.30 It is suggested that upon
the application of a creditor, the courts should not only be receptive
and grant the order requiring a wife to testify but should be lenient
in permitting a wide range of searching questions. The pre-bankruptcy
situation should be brought to light and where there has been no
intra-family hugger-muggery, there should be little reluctance on the
part of the wife to cooperate fully. It is further suggested that if
this intra family situation is vague and uncertain because of the recalcitrance of the wife and the bankrupt husband, the court should
refuse discharge under section 14(c) (7) of the act.31 - The ease with
which assets have been concealed within the family and remained
undisclosed in the bankruptcy proceeding can be largely laid to indifference or reluctance on the part of creditors to pursue vigorously
for disclosure, but the courts may also be at fault in unduly stifling
the creditors' inquiries into family affairs. In any event, herein is
a sore spot from which rumors have spread, tending to discredit the
whole bankruptcy proceeding.
This provision of the Bankruptcy Act declaring the competency of
the wife to testify in the husband's bankruptcy, provides further
that the wife may be required to appear before the court or the
judge of any state court for purposes of examination. 32 This may on
casual observation seem to give the bankruptcy court power to
compel a wife to testify in a state action although the state law
would not permit; however, this is not the case.3 3 It seems logical
that such provision was for convenience of the witness so that where
ordering the witness to appear before the bankruptcy court would
work a hardship, the order to appear before a conveniently located
judge of a state court might be issued. 34 This hearing before the judge
of the state court, however, relates only to a part of the proceedings
in bankruptcy and so the fact is that the state judge is as a matter
of courtesy hearing a bankruptcy matter. It is therefore logical that
the law of evidence of the Bankruptcy Act should apply in such proceeding before the state judge. Thus a wife may be compelled to
29. In re Gilbert, 10 Fed. Cas. 344, No. 5,410 (D. Mass. 1869). "1 cannot bring
myself to believe that congress intended to destroy this most sacred of all
confidences." Id. at 344.
30. Bankruptcy Act § 21(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1953). In re Weidenfeld,
254 Fed. 677 (2d Cir. 1918).
31. Bankruptcy Act § 14(c) (7), 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c) (7) (1953). Although
this section is pointed at the bankrupt, where he and his wife fail to explain
satisfactorily, there seems a stronger justification for refusal of discharge.
32. Bankruptcy Act.§ 21(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1953).
33. See Weeks v. Davis, 148 Okla. 230, 298 Pac. 267 (1931).
34. Ibid.
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testify there regardless of the law of that particular state.35 If,
however, a trustee in bankruptcy brings a full scale action in a
state court, the laws of competency and privilege of the state may apply
and the evidentiary law of the Bankruptcy Act has no application.
Therefore a wife in such action may not be called to testify if the
law of that state so provides, 36 section 21 of the Bankruptcy Act 37 notwithstanding. Query: In some matters where the bankruptcy court
and a state court may have concurrent jurisdiction, could these matters of competency of the wife as treated by the state law and the
Bankruptcy Act be a determinative force in selection of jurisdiction?
In summary, then, it will be noted that the bankruptcy court may
in its discretion require a wife to testify in her husband's bankruptcy
proceedings in the limited area touching on business transacted by
her or to which she is a party or to determine such facts. This requirement encompasses a wife's appearing before a state judge in
the bankruptcy proceeding but does not include full actions in state
courts although the trustee in bankruptcy is a party.38
IV. DOWER RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY.
Although dower rights in bankruptcy may be classified generally
into two categories (viz.: (1). dower rights when the husband is in
bankruptcy, and (2) dower rights in the wife's bankruptcy), the
usual situation is the problem of the treatment of dower in the husband's bankruptcy. The matter is clearly covered by the Bankruptcy
Act,39 but the act's reference to state law for the initial determinative
factor may leave the problem vague and uncertain in any particular
bankruptcy court. Section 70 (a) (5) provides that the trustee shall
take the title of the bankrupt in all property which he could have
transferred or might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him, or otherwise seized. 40 Whether the wife has
any dower interest which remains in her upon the husband's bankruptcy then depends upon whether under the applicable state law the
husband by transfer or his creditors by levy could have ended the
wife's dower right.
In jurisdictions where a wife's dower right continues against the
husband's property in the hands of the trustee, the problem arises
in the bankruptcy court as to the liquidation of the property so
encumbered. Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938, under a provision
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1953).
38. The wife is emphasized because she is the party usually involved; however, all problems are equally applicable to a husband. The word "spouse" is
used in § 21 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1953).
39. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2(a) (7) and 70(a), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 11(a) (7) (Supp.
1953), 110(a) (1953).
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953). -
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of the Bankruptcy Act stating that the trustee could "cause the estates
41
of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed,"
it was held that the bankrupt's real estate could not be sold free
and discharged from the inchoate dower of his wife without her consent.4 A nonconsenting wife therefore interfered substantially with
the marketability of the property and the price obtainable. This
situation is to some extent alleviated by the present act, which provides
that the trustee may "determine and liquidate all inchoate or vested
interests of the bankrupt's spouse in the property of any estate whenever, under the applicable laws of the state, creditors are empowered
to compel such spouse to accept a money satisfaction for such interest."43 The power of the trustee to sell real estate free of a wife's
continuing dower right without her consent is circumscribed by the
state law. The bankruptcy court, then, may sell free and clear of this
continuing dower right only with the wife's consent or where under
the applicable state law, creditors may compel such sale. It seems desirable for the trustee to have a broad power to sell free and clear of
dower interests if the wife receives adequate compensation for her
loss, as such liquidation in most instances would result in a better sale
price. Should there be any objection to a change empowering the
trustee to sell free of the dower right regardless of the law4 of the
particular state? It seems there would be no real objection
From the relative certainties, we like to move to the supposititious
and create possible problems that prick the mind of the academician.
Suppose, for instance, that the wife's dower right at the time of her
husband's bankruptcy is such that the trustee takes the husband's
property freed from any dower right of the wife. Suppose further
that the husband dies shortly. after his petition in bankruptcy. If
the wife's dower right is one that becomes absolute and indefeasible
in property of which her husband died seized, is there any possibility that she may assert a dower right now although she could not
at the time of the petition? The Bankruptcy Act literally cries out
a "no" answer. The trustee of the estate of the bankrupt shall be
vested with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of
the petition. 45 However, in Ehrhartv. New York Life Insurance Co., it
was held that the death of the husband after his petition in bankruptcy did not entitle the trustee to the death benefits of a life insurance policy that otherwise passed to the trustee, as against the wife
beneficiary.4 It can be argued that the supposed situation on dower
41. Bankruptcy Act § 2(7), 11 U.S.C.A. § 11(7) (1927).
42. Kelly v. Minor, 252 Fed. 115 (4th Cir. 1918).
43. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a) (7), 11 U.S.C.A. § 11(a) (7) (Supp. 1955).
44. Curtesy is not specially considered. However, its problems are similar
to those presented under dower.
45. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (a) (1953).
46. 45 F.2d 804 (S.D. Ill. 1929). For underlying motivating forces for de-
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and that of the insurance case are very similar, or that they are
completely disparate, yet the powerful underlying motivating forces
for decision are the same, and a holding that the wife's dower right on
the post-petition death of the husband must inure to her benefit would
be no more of a corruption of the act than the insurance case, if corruption it was.
The bankruptcy of a wife is less common but in that event, the
question as to the trustee's right to her dower interest presents itself.
Under section 70(a) (5), 47 all property which the wife could have
transferred or might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against her would pass to the trustee. Whether the trustee
takes such dower interest then depends upon its incidents as created
by state law. If the wife's dower interest is such that the trustee
would not take at the time of the petition, would he take it subsequently if the husband died within six months giving the bankrupt wife a vested interest under section 70(a) (7),48 which provides
that the trustee shall be vested with the title of the bankrupt of "contingent remainders, executory devises and limitations, rights of entry
for condition broken, rights or possibilities of reverter, and like interests in real property, which were nonassignable prior to bankruptcy and which, within six months thereafter, become assignable
interests or estates"? To claim that the wife's dower interest which
became vested within six months after her petition in bankruptcy
passes to the trustee would present a clash in the philosophy of construction favorably to the wife, and the general scope of section
70 (a) (7) and the second and third subparagraphs intending to vest in
the trustee property coming to the bankrupt within six months after
bankruptcy. 49 However, it is ventured that if such post-petition dower
interest is not otherwise exempt by state law, 50 it would not be held
to pass to the trustee as being a property interest included within the
meaning of section 70 (a) (7).51
Analogous to the problems of the dower interest in bankruptcy
are the questions which arise in connection with tenancies by the
entirety, joint tenancies, tenancies in common and community property. The determinative factor will be the applicable state law as it
creates these interests and whether they could have been transferred
or levied upon and sold under judicial process as provided for in
cision see also Myers v. Matley, 130 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1942), affd, 318 U.S.
622 (1942).
47. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).
48. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (7), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (7) (1952). (Emphasis
added.).
49. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (7) and subparagraphs 2 and 3, 11 U.S.C.A. §
110(a) (7) and subparagraphs 2 and 3 (1953).

50. Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Supp. 1955).
51. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (7), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (7) (1953).
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section 70 (a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act.52 No detailed treatment of
these special problems is intended here.
V. ALiVmoNy AND RELATED MATTERS IN BANKRUPTCY.
A divorced husband's bankruptcy in all probability will require
a consideration of his former wife's claims against him resulting from
their marriage and divorce. The usual situation would be one of overdue and future installments in a general alimony decree for periodic
payments. The overdue installments are clearly provable and allowable under section 63 (a) (1) ,53 and future installments may be allowed
under section 63 (a) (8).54 However, the court will usually refuse to
allow a claim for future installments as being not capable of liquidation or of reasonable estimation, as provided in section 57(d).55 A
wife may not be interested in presenting her claim for alimony where
the husband's estate is of little value inasmuch as her protection
56
comes under section 17(a) (2),
which provides that discharge in
bankruptcy shall not release him from liabilities for alimony due or
to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child. Itmay
be wise procedurally, however, for a wife to present her full claim
for alimony. A finding at that time by the bankruptcy court that the
future obligation is not capable of liquidation or of reasonable estimation would then prevent this future obligation, even in part, to the
risk of being later proved to be other than an alimony liability and
so discharged by the bankruptcy, as section 63 (d)57 provides that
where such contingent claim is proved but has not been allowed because of its uncertain nature, it is then not provable and so not discharged under section 1758 providing for discharge of all provable
debts.
Although the Bankruptcy Act clearly states that obligations for
alimony or for maintenance or support of wife and children shall not
be discharged, 59 whether the obligations provided for in the divorce
decree or agreed between the husband and wife are alimony or support
within the act may be questionable,60 and the use of the terms "ali52. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953). For a general summary of tenancies by
the entirety, joint tenancies, tenancies in common and community property in

bankruptcy, see CoLmR, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, 915-17 (1948).

53. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a) (1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (1)(1953).
54. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a) (8),

11 U.S.C.A. § 103 (a) (8) (1953).

55. Bankruptcy Act § 57(d), 11 U.S.C.A. § 93(d) (1943).
56. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a) (2), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (2) (1953).
57. Bankruptcy Act § 63 (d), 11 U.S.C.A. § 103 (d) (1953).

58. Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1953). For facts illustrating the
problem, see Avery v. Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940).
59. Bankruptcy Act, § 17, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1952).
60. E.g., see In re Hollister, 47 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 132 F.2d
861 (1943); Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (1940);
La Rue v. La Rue, 341 Ill. App. 411, 93 N.E.2d 823 (1950); D'andria v. Hageman, 253 App. Div. 518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 630, 16 N.E.2d
294 (1938); Battles v. Battles, 205 Okla. 587, 239 P.2d 794 (1952); Fife v. Fife, 1
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mony" or "support" in the decree or agreement have little probative
value.61 In determining whether the obligation is exempted from discharge, it should in many instances be tested by each standard separately as one may save the obligation from discharge but not the
other, i.e., the obligation may not be alimony but clearly one for
maintenance or support of the wife or child. Of these two tests
which provide freedom from discharge, that of maintenance or support is the broader and will save many stipulations and provisions in a
divorce decree from discharge which might not be anticipated before
observing the decisions in this area.6 2 These decisions will be considered later, herein.
. True alimony in gross is both alimony, and for support of the
wife and so not discharged 63 even though proved in full in the
bankruptcy proceeding. True separate maintenance agreements, 4
or true stipulations for support of wife and children made prior
to divorce or in the divorce proceeding are obligations not discharged, 65 and these cause only nominal concern under the clear
exceptions to discharge of section 17(a) (2). The trouble arises
when an agreement or decree ostensibly indicates it is alimony or
for support but is challenged as being at least in part an award
for money owed the wife by the husband prior to the divorce or agreement, or in payment for property which the husband appropriated
from the wife. For example, the stipulation or decree may provide
that the husband shall pay the wife $1000 a month alimony. Half of
this. may be based on the need for the husband to pay back to the
wife monies he in equity should replace, and the other half as his
obligation to care for his wife after divorce. The second half here
is clearly excepted from discharge under section 17(a) (2)66 but
should the first half also be excepted? Logically, it seems it should
not be. If the husband owed the wife on a note in a commercial venture, his bankruptcy would clearly discharge this obligation. If
the obligation is set out in a divorce stipulation or decree even
indiscriminately as alimony or for support, at or after bankruptcy,
the true nature of this obligation should require that it be segregated
and found discharged.
Utah 2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 (1954); Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148
(1949).
61. Cases cited note 60 supra.
62. E.g., see In re Hollister, 47 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 132 F,2d
861 (1943); Remondino v. Remondino, 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (1940):
Krupp v. Felter, 77 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1948); D'andria v. Hageman 253
App. Div. 518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Ist Dep't), af'd, 278 N.Y. 630, 16 N.E.2d 294
(1938).

63. Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949).
64. Holahan v. Holahan, 77 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Battles v. Battles,

205 Okla. 587, 239 P.2d 794 (1952).
65. Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949).
66. Bankruptcy Act, § 17(a) (2), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (2) (1953).
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This problem usually arises upon the wife's action to collect alimony or support money after the husband's bankruptcy and his refusal to pay on the grounds that the award was totally or partially
a statement adjusting dischargeable obligations between the parties.
Thus the matter is one normally raised in the state courts. That the
courts will look behind the decree or agreement to determine the
nature of the obligation and divide it into its components is unquestioned.67 In Avery v. Avery 68 a judgment based upon a former
divorce decree was inquired into to ascertain what parts of it were
originally for alimony or support of the wife and children. A
master was appointed to determine what portion of the decree
was in payment for the wife's dower and other property rights which
would be subject to discharge; and in La Rue v. La Rue 69 a divorce
decree ordering the payment to the wife was held to be an order to
pay back money she had loaned to her husband and that this obligation was discharged in bankruptcy. The viewpoint of these cases
seems to be that adjustments in a divorce decree providing for debts
owed the wife and for her property rights are civil obligations arising
from arms length dealings and so such obligations are discharged.
Only that part of the decree providing for the wife's care in the future
arising out of the duty created by the marital relation is free from
discharge under this restrictive interpretation.
Such an interpretation seems too narrow. The party injured is
the wife. The party benefited is the husband. Third parties are in
no way affected at the time of the bankruptcy and future creditors
of the husband are on notice of his divorce decree obligations. It permits a husband to relieve himself of obligations created during marriage and which in all probability never would have been created
except for the marriage. Then, too, such a narrow interpretation
disregards the fact that the wife at the time of divorce and the
court in its decree are considering the adequacy of the entire award
in relation to the future, and a new undischargeable obligation is
and should be the basis upon which it is determined. An agreement
or decree requiring the payment of a certain amount to the wife if
undischargeable is an award to her of rights far superior to any
claim for a similar amount she may have against her husband regardless of the divorce. It is contended then that all general decrees for
payment to the wife or agreements between divorced spouses for
such payments should be nondischargeable in bankruptcy unless it
could be clearly shown that any part of the award was made as
67. E.g., see Avery v. Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940); Lyon v. Lyon,
115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949); La Rue v. La Rue, 341 Ill. App. 411, 93
N.E.2d 823 (1950).
68. 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940).
69. 341 Ill. App. 411, 93 N.E.2d 823 (1950).
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payment of a debt owed to the wife or for property rights of the wife,
and that the remaining portion of the award was intended and
evaluated as a full adjustment for future care for the wife and children.
This may be going somewhat farther than present holdings, but
the way is pointed by D'andriav. Hageman,7 0 where the husband and
wife stipulated in divorce that the husband would repay a definite
sum of money which he had borrowed from her during their marriage,
and that this would be in lieu of any payments for maintenance and
support. This was held to be for support of the wife under section
17 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act and so not discharged. The statement
of the court in Remondino v. Remondino gives a proper background
for decision: "If, upon a consideration of the entire transaction the
court determines that the purpose of the judgment for support money
is to guarantee the economic safety of the wife by the husband, then
his discharge in bankruptcy does not affect his liability under the
71
judgment."
The provision of the Bankruptcy Act excepting from discharge
liabilities for maintenance or support of wife or child7 2 projects
itself into other than divorce or separation situations. Many claims
against the bankrupt husband and father will have arisen upon the
furnishing of necessities to him for his family, such as medical care,
food, clothing and shelter. It is clear that these claims are discharged in bankruptcy.73 Yet claims by one furnishing necessaries
to the wife and children to aid them because of their need after
abandonment by the husband and father are not discharged. 74 The
dividing point seems to be whether the necessaries were furnished
upon an agreement with the husband directly or through his wife
or children, or furnished because of need resulting from the failure
or refusal of the father to maintain and support them. Thus obligations arising because of purchases by a child or wife under any agency
relationship with the father or husband would be discharged on his
bankruptcy while claims for necessaries furnished during a period of
75
abandonment would not be.

The position of claims of government units for relief granted
a bankrupt are atypically treated. Although relief is based on
need and inability of the husband to furnish basic necessities, such
70. 253 App. Div. 518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 630, 16
N.E.2d 294 (1938).
71. 41 Cal. App. 2d 208, 106 P.2d 437, 441 (1940); see In re Hollister, 47
F. Supp. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 132 F.2d 861 (1943).
72. §17(a) (2), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (2) (1953).
73. See In re Meyers, 12 F.2d 938 (W.D.N.Y. 1926); In re Lo Grasso, 23 F.
Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938); Lieb v. Auerbach, 10 N.J. Super. 391, 76 A.2d
726 (L. 1950).
74. In re Meyers, 12 F.2d 938 (W.D.N.Y. 1926); accord, In re Lo Grasso, 23
F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).

75. Cases cited note 73 supra.
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claims for relief paid are usually held to be discharged by the
bankruptcy of the husband and father under section 17 (a) (2) of the
Bankruptcy Act. 76 Although an individual furnishing necessities
to the family where the husband has failed or refused to make provision for his family has a nondischargeable claim, a furnishing of relief where the law creates a claim for repayment has been held a
dischargeable obligation as such relief was not furnished because of
not for support of
a family relationship to the bankrupt and therefore
7
act."
the
of
17
section
under
children
and
wife
The impact of such a conclusion may be mitigated by interpreting
the claim for payments for relief granted to be of such a nature as
not to be a provable claim at the time of bankruptcy 78 and so not
discharged. 79 Then, too, the statutory provisions may create a lien
on the husband's property to the value of relief granted and this
would be recognized in bankruptcy. 80
A question may be raised as to the dischargeability of orders for
payment in an annulment decree. The usual decree of annulment
provides for readjustment of property rights and no provision for
alimony. Thus it seems logical that in most annulment situations
all such obligations for payment of money would be discharged by the
putative husband's bankruptcy. Such ordered payments are for the
adjustment of property rights and not for maintenance and support of
a wife and are so discharged in bankruptcy. 81 However, it is suggested
that the test for annulment decrees should be the same as that for
divorce decrees, 8 2 at least for the voidable marriage. Thus any award
in an annulment action which is in fact for support and maintenance
of the woman who occupied the position of wife should not be
subject to discharge upon the bankruptcy of the supposed husband.
If the marriage were absolutely void, to bring any decree of award
within the exception to discharge would shock those steeped in
the traditional concept of such marriages, but even here if the
decree of annulment is an attempt to work out an adjustment which
is primarily concerned with caring for the supposed wife, such obligation should not be discharged in bankruptcy and need not be under
section 17 (a) (2) 83 with a realistic interpretation of the meaning of the
76. 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (2) (1953).
77. Hilliard v. De Ciuceis, 202 Misc. 197, 115 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
78. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 103 (a) (1953).
79. State v. Murzyn, 142 Conn. 329, 114 A.2d 210 (1955).

80. Of interest to the attorney is the holding that an allowance in a decree

for attorney's fees in a divorce action creates an obligation which is for
maintenance of the wife and so not discharged under § 17 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Ill. 1934). Neither is
the obligation to pay attorney's fees created by stipulation between the husband and wife in a divorce action discharged. Doyle v. Hollister, 39 N.Y.S.2d
124 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1942).
81. Fife v. Fife, 1 Utah 2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 (1954).
82. Discussed in text supra.
83. 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (2) (1953).
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word "wife" in that section. The need for such an extending interpretation will usually arise where the parties to the intended marriage
were in good faith but mistaken. In the situation where the supposed
husband has wrongfully induced the other into a void marriage, the
obligations he is to pay under the annulment decree or any other
theory of liability to the wronged woman should not be discharged
in his bankruptcy under section 17(a) (2)84 providing that liabilities
for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or
property shall be exempt from discharge.
A less frequent problem of alimony in bankruptcy is the question
as to whether a wife's rights to alimony are taken by the trustee as
part, of her estate and so available to creditors in bankruptcy. The
broad provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that the trustee shall take
all property including rights of action which the bankrupt could
have transferred or might have been levied upon, except exempt
property, 85 again sends us to the state law for determination of these
matters. Upon close analysis it will be seen: first, that if the alimony
status at the time of bankruptcy is exempt by state law the wife
retains her rights under it; second, if not exempt the alimony rights
will pass to the trustee if they were transferable; and, third, if not
exempt, the wife's alimony rights will pass to the trustee if they might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process. These may
overlap in some respects but the scope of each must be carefully
considered in determination of the particular case. If, then, a wife's
alimony rights are exempt from her creditors under the applicable
state law the trustee in bankruptcy will not be entitled to them. A
state statute, however, exempting alimony from creditors may be
held not to exempt provisions of a decree or settlement which are in
fact final property divisions or alimony in gross and so the trustee
would take.86 As long as the state statute provides for an actual exemption, it will be recognized in bankruptcy and so the alimony
exemption may be quite broad in some states and narrow in others.
If the status of the wife's alimony right is not exempt, it still may
be such that it is neither transferable nor leviable property or a
cause of action under section 70 (a) (5)87 of the Bankruptcy Act and so
not an interest that would go to the trustee. In the case of In re
Le Claire,88 it was held that.a claim for alimony in a pending divorce
action was not transferable nor could it have been levied upon and
therefore would not pass to the trustee, although the alimony award
84. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a) (2), 11 U.S.C.A. §35(a) (2) (1953).
85. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).
86. In re Fiorio, 128 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1942).
87. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).
88. 124 Fed. 654 (N.D. Iowa 1903); Glasser v. Rogers, 53 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.
N.Y.1943).
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was made five days after the petition in bankruptcy. Whether the
trustee in the wife's bankruptcy takes her interest in an alimony
obligation of her former husband depends then upon the treatment
of such obligation under the applicable state law, and as alimony is
generally exempt or is an interest not transferable or subject to levy
under the applicable state law, it seldom becomes an asset in the
hands of the trustee in bankruptcy.

VI. THE HoMESTEAD iN BANKRUPTCY.
An effective homestead exemption provided by the state law will
be recognized in bankruptcy and the trustee ordinarily takes no
interest in the property so exempt. 89 However, the trustee may upon
finding that the property in which the homestead exists is indivisible,
sell the entire property free from the homestead, causing the exemption to shift from the property to the proceeds. 9° This power to
sell free and clear is especially important in states where the dollar
value homestead exemption is small compared to the present value
of the indivisible property in which the homestead is claimed. If
the property is divisible, the homestead should be set aside by the
bankruptcy court and no further jurisdiction asserted over it.91
The most troublesome problem of late has been whether a homestead
exemption could be perfected after the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy. It is contended that since the trustee is vested with the
title of the bankrupt at the time of the petition and that such interest
is equivalent to the rights of a creditor holding a lien, it would be impossible for a homestead to be perfected after the petition. 92 However,
it is now well established, and correctly so, that if under the state
law the homestead could have been perfected in a nonbankruptcy
situation, it may also be perfected in that post-petition status.93
The various states have recognized that the declaration and perfecting of homestead exemptions are often neglected, and to protect
the family from frequent complete loss of the exemption, statutory
permission to perfect the exemption is granted before execution sale.
In this situation the claimant is put on notice of the need for perfecting
his homestead exemption by the levy and adequate time is available
for the perfection. If the petition in bankruptcy cuts off this possibility, in many cases, especially in the involuntary bankruptcy, the
one entitled to homestead would have lost his right to claim without
89. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (1953).
90. In re Brown, 228 Fed. 533 (W.D. Ky. 1915); In re Oderkirk, 103 Fed. 779
(D. Vt. 1900).
91. See Morgridge v. Converse, 72 N.E.2d 295 (Ohio App. 1947), rev'd, 150
Ohio St. 239; 81 N.E.2d 112 (1948).
92. See Myers v. Matley, 130 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1942), ajFd, 318 U.S. 622
(1943).
93. Myers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622 (1943); In re Curmar Mfg. Co., 91 F.
Supp. 647 (S.D. Calif. 1950); In re Davies, 96 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Va. 1949).
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prior notice of the seriousness of his situation. However, as now
interpreted the homestead claimant may perfect his exemption any
time before sale of the property by the trustee if the state law permits
perfection to time of sale or execution.

VII.

HUSBAND'S INSURANCE

m BANKRUPTCY.

94
Although the life insurance provision of the Bankruptcy Act
is not expressly directed to the family situation, it in fact is of greatest
importance to the family of the bankrupt. The most usual situation
is life insurance upon the husband or father with the wife or estate
as beneficiary. It is not to be doubted that a husband and father
in taking out life insurance is usually motivated by a desire to care
for his family in the event of his death and not to create an asset for
creditors. If the rights in the life insurance were taken by the trustee
in bankruptcy and liquidated, the contemplated protection for the
family would be ended and probably be irreplaceable. The provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act are expressly concerned with this problem
and have alleviated the severity of such seizure and liquidation of
life insurance interests in two ways: first, by the broad exemption
of section 70(a) 95 under which life insurance exempt by state law
would not go to the trustee; and, second, by providing that life
insurance not exempt and which will go to the trustee may have such
insurance released from the bankruptcy by payment to the trustee
of the cash surrender value.9 6 The dual nature of this beneficent
treatment of life insurance must be recognized for in combination
they give excellent protection to the family of the bankrupt insured.
If the state law has liberal exemptions of life insurance, it may not
be necessary to consider the release factor of section 70 (a) (5) 9 but
in those states having a low dollar value exemption the combination of
both the exemption and cash surrender value release may come into

play.
The Bankruptcy Act 98 provides that the bankrupt may, within
thirty days after the cash surrender value of non-exempt life insurance
has been ascertained and stated to the trustee, pay the trustee such
value and then hold the policy free of the claims of creditors in
bankruptcy. The referee should require the trustee to give prompt
notice to the insured of the cash surrender value and it would not
seem remiss for the referee as part of his operating procedure to
insist that the bankrupt be carefully and fully advised of his rights
therein. It would not seem out of place for the referee to request that
94. § 70(a) (5), U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).

95. Bankruptcy Act § 70 (a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (a) (1953).

96. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).
97. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (a) (5) (1953).
98. § 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).

1956 ] BANKRUPTCY FROM FAMILY LAW PERSPECTIVE

805

the bankrupt's wife be informed of the right to release the insurance,
at least if the husband had no objection. It may be difficult for the
bankrupt to raise the cash surrender value, but exempt property
could possibly be the basis for the security needed. In many instances
the wife will have resources for paying this cash surrender value
and usually it would be an advantage for her to release the insurance.
If the cash surrender value of life insurance which has passed to
the trustee is not paid within thirty days thus releasing the insur99
ance, the policy passes to the trustee as an asset in the bankruptcy.
This evokes no criticism until the situation in which the insured bankrupt dies after the thirty day release period has passed without the
cash surrerider value having been paid. 100 The problem then becomes
one as to whether the trustee takes the death benefit under the policy
or only the cash surrender value. The determination of this question
is logical only because it is one involving family interests, and so it
is held that the interest the trustee takes is the cash surrender value,
and the death benefits payable because of the death of the bankrupt,
less the cash surrender value, go to the named beneficiary, although
the insurance was not released or intended to be released by the insured, and the time within which the release could have been demanded elapsed.' 01 The result seems right as the area wherein it
will most frequently occur is one beneficial to the family unit.
Of course, particular insurance policies may be taken out wherein
the rights are such that the trustee would not in any event take an
interest in them, as where the wife is named beneficiary and no
right to change the beneficiary without the consent of the beneficiary
is reserved, 0 2 but normally this is not the case and the protection to
the family by the exemption of insurance by state laws plus the right
to release that not exempt by paying the cash surrender value seems
desirable and adequate.
VIII. OTHER MATTERS

IN

BANKRUPTCY OF SPECIAL INTEREST

TO THE FAmY.
No concept of the Bankruptcy Act has become more routinely
fixed than that of the trustee in bankruptcy taking title to all
property owned by the bankrupt at the date of the petition and no
other property. This may trap the unwary, for hidden in the unlettered
paragraphs of the act are two insidious provisions which provide
circumstances under which after acquired property may go to
99. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).
100. See Ehrhart v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F.2d 804 (S.D. Ill. 1929).
101. Ibid.
102. See In re Grant, 21 F.2d 88 (W.D. Wis. 1927).
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the trustee in bankruptcy 03 These are of especial interest in the
family area because they are most apt to occur within that relationship.
It is therein provided that interests by the entirety which, within six
months, become transferable solely by the bankrupt, vests in the
trustee, and further that property which comes to the bankrupt by
devise, bequest or inheritance within six months after bankruptcy
goes to the trustee in bankruptcy. 04 The intent here is clear but the
advisability of taking such after acquired property is questionable.
It may have created a period of time wherein the change of existing
wills, of a testamentary rearrangement of intestate devolution, is
desirable at least from the standpoint of the benefactor and the
object of his benefaction. This may readily be depicted by the
supposition of a bankrupt's wealthy father who is elderly and in poor
health at the time of his son's bankruptcy. It seems the act in
this respect goes too far in subjecting to the bankruptcy the property
received by the bankrupt under a will or inheritance within six
months of bankruptcy, but such is the present status of the law. 105
Although the law of bankruptcy is strict on the time within which
claims of creditors must be presented to be allowed, the arbitrary
six-months requirement is tempered in the case of infants' claims.
Such claims may be filed six months longer if the infant was without
a guardian and was without notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. 00
The claim of the infant then will not be permitted to be filed for
allowance in any event more than a year after the first date set
for the first meeting of the creditors. This may seem somewhat
harsh but when considered in connection with the dischargeability
of claims, the interests of infants do not seem unduly infringed upon.
Section 57 (n)10 7 deals only with allowance of claims and does not
determine whether the infant may have a continuing right against the
bankrupt. An infant's claim would not be discharged if not duly
scheduled and if the infant had no notice of the bankruptcy. 0 8 Where
the infant's claim has been properly scheduled by the bankrupt, in all
probability a guardian would be appointed in time to file the claim
properly. If the infant's claim is not properly listed by the bankrupt,
the claim in all probability would not be discharged. Normally this
would be to the over-all advantage of the infant.
The family is further considered in relation to the claiming of
exemptions. Thus, the bankrupt's right to claim exemptions is preserved upon his death and may be exercised for the benefit of the
spouse or dependent children surviving him.109 It is important to
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (8), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (a) (8) (1953).
See note 103 supra.
Ibid.
Bankruptcy Act § 57(n), 11 U.S.C.A. § 93(n) (Supp. 1955).
11 U.S.C.A. § 93(n) (Supp. 1955).
Bankruptcy Act § 17(a) (3), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (3) (1953).
Bankruptcy Act § 8, 11 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1927).
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notice here, that the bankrupt's right to exemption shall be preserved. Suppose the bankrupt has waived his exemptions or has not
diligently claimed them and then dies. If the state law does not
permit the wife to claim exemptions, may she under section 8 of the
Bankruptcy Act" 0 claim exemptions although the deceased bankrupt
could not have claimed at the time of his death? If "the bankrupt's
right to exemption""' refers to the situation at his death, the wife
probably could not claim after his death,- but if that provision
means the right to exemption as recognized at the time of the petition,
the wife or dependent children could assert the exemptions although
the bankrupt could not, had he lived. Logic seems to press for a
result which would permit the wife to claim exemptions only if the
bankrupt could have at his death, but the heart asks for more leniency
toward both the wife and dependent children, and the heart dictates
the best family law.
Other disturbing matters in the purlieus of the family such as
seduction, breach of promise, criminal conversation and wrongful
injuries to or death of relatives, are specifically considered in the
Bankruptcy Act." 2 Under section 17 (a) (2) 113 of the Bankruptcy Act,
even though liabilities for seduction, breach of promise, or criminal
conversation have reached the point of being provable, they are not
affected by discharge and so are enforceable in the post-bankruptcy
period. It must be noted, however, that the exception from discharge
of provable claims is only for seduction of an unmarried female, for
breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction, or for
criminal conversation, a much narrower field of exception than might
at first glance be realized.
It is further provided that rights of action for seduction and
criminal conversation shall not vest in the trustee unless such rights
4
were subject to the creditors by the applicable state law," and
rights of action for injuries to a relative, whether resulting in death
or not, will not go to the trustee unless subject to creditors under
state law." 5 The possible scope, of this injury to the relative provision, is very great.
Section 70 (a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that rights of
action ex delicto for injuries to a relative, whether resulting in death
or not, shall not vest in the trustee unless by the law of the state
such rights of action are subject to creditors." 6 Relatives include
110. 11 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1927).
111. Bankruptcy Act § 8, 11 U.S.C.A. § 26 (Supp. 1955).
112. Bankruptcy Act §§ 17(a) (2), 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 35(a) (2), 110
(a)(5)(1953).
113. 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (2)(1953).
114. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (a) (5) (1953).
115. Ibid.
116. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).
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persons related by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree
as determined by the common law and includes the spouse." 7 Clearly
then, the claims of the bankrupt for wrongful death of his wife,
children or any other relative giving him a claim by the law of the
particular state is not an asset in the trustee's hands if not subject to
creditors by that state. The same result would be obtained on the
bankrupt's claim for injuries to his spouse or children. Although
these claims may be transferable by the bankrupt under the applicable state law, they do not come to the trustee unless they were
reachable by creditors, thus the proviso of section 70(a) (5)118 is
an important limitation on the dual test of transferability or creditor
subjection in the general scope of that section.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
In this broad area of, family relations it is recognized that special
rules of law are justified and necessary and that hard arms length
principles are not binding or desirable as this venerable status comes
in conflict with outside interests. This special consideration extended
the family institution is expressly evidenced in many provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act, although cryptically placed in several of its important aspects. The attitude of the courts generally, in interpreting
the Act's provisions relating to family matters has been a benignant
one. In construction and interpretation every consideration should
be given these family interests with a view to the importance of
the institution itself. However, the family status should not be permitted blindly as a haven for fraud or a screen behind which creditors
may not cast a questioning glance. A family relationship entitled to
protection is one from which the economic picture is freely and clearly
given the bankruptcy court. The privilege of requesting its power to
be released from oppressive and overbearing debt is meant to be
granted those who in good faith and candor request it. Perhaps a
closer scrutiny into the intra-family economic picture in the antebankruptcy period is justified. It is authorized by the Bankruptcy Act.
117. Bankruptcy Act § 1 (27), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 (27) (Supp. 1955).
118. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) (5) (1953).

